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FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT AND
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

A

DMINISTRATIVE economic management, within the

meaning of the present study, is the process of guiding
and controlling various activities of private business by certain government agencies. The determinations made by the
agencies as a part of this process are similar in nature to the
policy decisions made by business managers or by the boards
and officers of corporations.
It is the purpose of this paper to show that the federal
agencies engaged in administrative economic management,
as well as the courts, will be impeded in their work by the
Administrative Procedure Act.1
The Act uses general or specific terms which place most of
the managerial determinations within the category of formal
rules 2 or licenses;' it requires a judicialized procedure for
1 60 S"AT. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1946).
2 The determinations in respect to economic management are generally placed
under the definition of rules by the fact that they are nearly always of "par.
ticular applicability and of future effect." They are specifically placed under
rules by the fact that rules "include the approval or prescription for the future
of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices,
facilities, appliances, services, or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or
accounting, or practices bearing upon any of the foregoing." (§ 2(c)).
a Several managerial functions come under the definition of licensing, such
as granting certificates of public interest, convenience and necessity, certain
approvals, registrations, etc. The Act provides that the word license shall include
"the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, approval, registration,
charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission." The
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the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a formal rule ' and
for much of the activity connected with licensing;, and it
subjects licensing and rule making, as defined by it, to judicial review of a very broad scope. 6 In so doing the Act
reverses the long time trend of both law and jurisprudence
toward the maintenance of an effective separation of powers
between administration and adjudication by two principal
methods: leaving the administrative agencies, especially
those which make policy, free to use a non-judicialized procedure; and limiting the scope of judicial review as far as
possible while still protecting legal rights. This constitutionally and economically proper trend was reversed by the Administrative Procedure Act, which is quite out of step with
the realities of the present day regulatory process and with
the relationships which have developed and should continue
between the courts and the economic managerial authorities.
term licensing "includes agency process respecting the grant, renewal, denial,
revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification, or conditioning of a license." (§ 2(e)).
4 A judicialized procedure in respect to rules governing economic management is provided for by § 4(b), which says: "Where rules are required by statute
to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, the requirements of §§ 7 and 8 [which have to do with hearings and decisions] shall apply
in place of the provisions of this subsection." Since the statutes providing for
economic control usually so provide, this provision of the Act is widely effective.
It is true that the doctrine of the Act in respect to the separation of functions,
and certain provisions as to the making of decisions, may in certain cases not be
applied. In general the proceedings for formal rules, i.e., those concerned with
economic determinations, are the same as for adjudication.
5 A judicialized procedure in respect to licensing results from the fact that
the word "order" includes licensing, and "'Adjudication' means agency process
for the formulation of an order" (§ 2(d)). It is true that the separation of
function "shall not apply to determining applications for initial licenses . . . "
(§ 5(c)). All the other provisions of §§ 5, 7 and 8, however, are applicable to
licensing proceedings.
6 That the determinations in respect to administrative management are subject to the judicial review provisions of the Act, with their broad scope, is evident
from §§ 5, 10(a) and 10(c) of the Act. Section 5 states that such review is
to be applied in "every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for agency hearing", which of course
includes formal rule making. Section 10(a) provides for judicial review when
a person has suffered "legal wrong because of any agency action, or [is] adversely
affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute. . . ." Section 10(c) contains the sweeping statement: "Every agency action
made reviewable by statute and every final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to judicial review."
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How the Act injuriously affects the function of economic
management can best be understood by making an analysis
of that function, followed by a rather detailed examination
of the Act in relation thereto.
I. An Analysis of the Economic Management Function
The chief factors of federal administrative management
are almost identical with those of private management. They
include: (a) determining whether or not a business shall be
established, expanded, decreased, or discontinued; (b) determining where a business shall be located; (c) providing
for the financing of the business by the issue and sale of
securities; (d) making determinations as to personnel;
(e) making decisions as to accounting and reporting methods; (f) determining upon depreciation and reserves;
(g) making decisions as to kinds of service, extent of service, or discontinuance of service; (h) making agreements
with others as to joint service or use of facilities; and (i) establishing wages, rates, classifications, or prices.
Several of the independent boards and commissions, as
well as various other agencies, in dealing with some or nearly
all of these problems, are making determinations regarding
them which have a profound effect upon the overhead management of private business. This is particularly true of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Communications Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Authority,
the Commodity Exchange Commission, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Department of Agriculture, and
the Wage and Hour Contract Division. These agencies, beside their other functions, are charged with making economic
adjustments in a complex society. The chief reasons for investing them with such power are: (a) the attempt to prevent monopoly, cut throat competition, unnecessary duplication of facilities, discrimination, unfair practices and classifications, fraud, gambling in commodities and stocks, and
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other economic ills; and (b) the hope of securing efficient
and cheap service and economic stability without impairing
the legal rights of those affected.
The agencies which are performing these functions are
not merely police agencies established to enforce the exact
provisions of detailed laws, but are powerful managerial
organizations charged with adjusting economic and social
relationships in the general interest. They are not, in carrying out these functions, judicial agencies which merely pass
upon cases, that are brought before them. They are, rather,
agencies of the legislature itself, operating in important economic fields to manage the affairs which Congress has committed to them. They are not creators of policy except in a
minor and subordinate sense; for the basic policies which
they carry out have been laid down by Congress. They are,
however, operating within the field of policy.
In connection with their work of economic management,
these agencies must make determinations which necessarily
involve a high degree of judgment and discretion. This discretion is in part bestowed by Congress; in part it is a necessary element of administrative activity-that is, it is inherent
in the subject matter handled. The agencies use it for the
purpose of carrying out law. In so doing they are administering. In short, when agencies are engaged in economic
management, even though their procedures may be partly
modeled after the judicial pattern, their activity is administrative rather than judicial.
In connection with the function of making administrative
determinations, a wide variety of special powers and techniques are provided, including many that are not and could
not be given to the courts under our constitutional system.
Among them are: (a) the power to initiate action to protect
the public interest; (b) the right to make independent int For examples of such powers see Blachly and Oatman, Actual Legitimate

Original Cost as a Basis for Utility Regulation--the Experience of the Federal
Power Commission, 36 Gao. L. J. 487, 497-498 (1948).
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vestigations both to assist Congress and to enforce the aw;
(c) the right to make studies; (d) the right or duty of reporting to Congress and making suggestions as to legislation;
(e) the power to formulate rules of procedure and practice;
(f) the right to establish and enforce accounting and reporting systems and require reports; (g) the authority to have
access to accounts and reports; (h) the power to hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and documents, administer oaths,
take depositions and take other similar actions necessary to
carry out -their functions. It must be noted that all of these
special powers and techniques are essential for making managerial determinations in the public interest while protecting
private rights. These agencies are generally given by Congress large expert staffs to assist them in carrying out their
functions.
Many of the powers and techniques are used in wholly
administrative actions, that is, actions where there are no
determinations affecting the rights of individuals, such as
the making of examinations and investigations by field
agents; the requiring, collecting and filing of a multitude
of records and accounts; the receiving and answering of communications from those who may be interested; and so on.
The agencies are further engaged in the process of making
adjustments which are wholly administrative in nature, especially when attempting to settle difficulties without the
necessity for a formal proceeding.
Such powers and techniques, and the administrative functions connected therewith, are not given to the boards and
commissions so that they may make purely judicial decisions
between two opposing parties. These agencies are not courts;
their function is to protect the public interest. Nor are these
functions given to such agencies so that they may legislate,
but so that they may administer the policies laid down by
Congress. In other words, such authorities, in so far as they
are engaged in the functions of administrative management,
are agents of the legislature engaged in administering and
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in making determinations for the primary purpose of protecting the general public interest. The special powers bestowed upon them, the techniques which they use, and the
administrative activities which they carry on are all a part
of one process, administrative management, which cannot be
broken up into separate and distinct parts. It is impossible
to say where one feature of the process ends and another
begins.
It is true that In protecting the public interest the agencies
must act in a fair and impartial manner, and must not invade
the legal relationships that obtain when a privately owned
and managed economic activity is regulated in the public
interest. Their determinations must not be arbitrary, capricious, or made without due consideration of all the complex
factors involved in the problem of management; for in such
case both private rights and the interests of the public would
suffer.
The fact that the agencies make their determinations by
a procedure which has some of the aspects of judicial procedure does not affect their fundamental activities. Their
formal determinations are not judicial but administrative
in nature. The fact that such determinations are made after
a somewhat judicialized procedure may justify calling this
part of their activity administrative adjudication (with particular emphasis upon the administrative aspect), but it is
certainly not simple adjudication, as it is classified by the
Administrative Procedure Act.'
Some examples will be given of the fact that an administrative agency performing managerial functions makes determinations which are largely administrative and discretionary in nature. (a) When deciding whether to grant a certificate for the establishment of a new motor common carrier
service, the Interstate Commerce Commission must take into
consideration some of the following matters, and perhaps
8

§§ 5, 7, 8.
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many others: Is the territory already adequately served by
other. carriers? Will the establishment of the new route
make it impossible for all routes to give adequate service?
Is a new carrier needed in order to provide for some important special type of service which cannot be furnished by
the present carrier? ' Is the applying carrier financially able
to give adequate service? (b) In respect to the issuance of
certificates of public interest convenience and necessity for
natural gas pipe lines by the Federal Power Commission,
the significant social and economic considerations may include any or all of -the following: Whether there are gas reserves available to the applicant, sufficient to meet the demands to be placed upon them; whether the applicant has
been able to make valid contracts for gas supply; whether
the terms of the contracts are sufficient to guarantee an adequate and long range gas supply; whether the applicant is
financially able to develop satisfactory pipe lines; whether
the pipe line is of sufficient size to deliver the gas at the most
reasonable price; whether the applicant has an adequate
market for his gas; whether other demands on the gas supply
region are such as to make uncertain the supply of gas to
the applicant; whether the wider extension of natural gas
will cause great injury to our fuel economy; whether or not
construction materials are available; whether the end purpose for which the gas is to be used will have a deleterious
effect upon our fuel economy; what will be the effect upon
the coal mining, railroad, tug and barge operators, and upon
the workers engaged in these industries, of the wide extension of natural gas pipe lines?
The foregoing are not theoretical questions, but are such
as are discussed every day before the Interstate Com1
merce Commission and the Federal Power Commission. O
9 For example, the carrying of fresh vegetables by motor truck, direct from
fields in a part of New Jersey where there is no rail transportation which can
deliver the product while still fresh to New York City.
10 See for example, the Brief of Interveners, In the Matter of Trans-Continental Gas Pipe Line Co., Inc., before the Federal Power Commission of the

United States, March 15, 1948.
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They are not only problems of business management,
but of social management as well. Such questions cannot be solved in any absolute manner. They inherently
involve a large amount of discretion. The evidence is merely
a basis for the fact finding on which the decision rests, and
in general the weight to be given it is a matter for the
agency's discretion.
In respect to the fixing of rates, Congress has given various commissions a large amount of implied discretion by
statute. Thus, the law regarding the national transportation
policy (inaugurated in 1920 and strengthened by the act of
1940) provides:"
It is hereby declared to be the national transportation
policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions

of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the
inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to

encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable
charges for transportation services, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States
and the duly authorized officials thereof; and to encourage
fair wages and equitable working conditions; all to the end
of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other

means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the
United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense.
This policy places the Interstate Commerce Commission
in a general managerial position. It may use its appropriate
powers, including the rate mechanism, to make the multitude
of economic and social adjustments necessary to carry out
the broad purposes of the Act. The Commission is continually engaged in the process of approving or making specific adjustments, in respect to rates, joint rates, services,
etc., between different types of carriers, between types of
11 54 STAT. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1946).
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products carried, and between localities; in order to prevent
destructive competition, to prevent prohibitive and restrictive rates, to enable low priced goods to flow in commerce,
to preserve the inherent. advantages of certain types of
transportation, and to provide for the distribution of traffic
in such a way as to insure that all transportation facilities
can function.
The hearings in such matters can in no sense be regarded
as judicial proceedings. The facts adduced and the facts
found are not such data as whether or not a specific event
which has some relationship to a claimed right took place
upon a given day, but contribute information bearing upon
complicated relationships. "The process of rate making,"
said the Supreme Court, in Board of Trade v. United
States,'2
is essentially empiric. The stuff of the process is fluid and
changing-the resultant of factors that must be valued as well
as weighed. Congress has therefore delegated the enforcement
of transportation policy -to a permanent expert body and has
charged it with the duty of being responsive to Isthe dynamic
character of transportation problems .... Any solution (of
rate-break combinations for grain) had to rest upon informed
judgment. And judgment in a situation like this implies, ultimately, prophesy based on the facts in the record as illumined
by the seasoned wisdom of the expert body.14 . .. Neither
rule of thumb nor formula nor general principles provide a
ready answer. We certainly have neither technical competence nor legal authority to pronounce upon the wisdom of
the course taken by the Commission. It is not for us to tinker
with so sensitive an organism as the grain rate structure... 15

The authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission
to make minimum rates for the utilities under its jurisdiction may well be one of the chief methods of implementing
the policy of "preserving a national transportation system
by water, highway, and rail, as well as by other means." If
12

314 U.S. 534, 546, 62 S.Ct. 366, 86 L.Ed. 432 (1942).

1a

Ibid.

14 Id. at 547.
15 Id. at 548.
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all modes of transportation are to be maintained by the price
mechanism, it must be possible for minimum rates to be
established, in order to prevent destructive rate wars which
might interfere with the operations of one or more means of
transportation and might make it impossible for them to
carry out their functions adequately.
The development of competition, which has destroyed the
former nearly monopolistic situation of the railways, and the
use of the methods given by Congress to the Interstate Commerce Commission to preserve all forms of transportation,
have meant that the judicial economic formula of rate making, never adequate, is now obsolete. Instead of holding
hearings of a quasi judicial nature, and using judicial meth.
ods of fixing rates which will produce a fair rate of return
upon the value of the railway property, the Commission is
exercising a managerial role. It does this by assenting to,
adjusting, or requiring hundreds of thousands of individual
rates, in such a way as to meet the criteria laid down in the
National Transportation Policy. In respect to the general
rate level it must take into consideration such things as the
general price level, the wage level, the needs of national
defense, and other large social and economic factors.
For the fixing of air mail rates, the Civil Aeronautics Act
provides that the Civil Aeronautics Authority shall take into
consideration, among other factors: 6
The condition that such air carriers may hold and operate
under certificates authorizing the carriage of mail only by providing necessary and adequate, facilities and service . . . and
the need of each such air carrier for compensation for the
transportation of mail sufficient to insure the performance of
such service, and together with all other revenue of the air
carrier, to enable such air carrier under honest, economical,

and efficient management, to maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the extent and of the character
and quality required for the commerce of the United States,
the Postal Service, and the national defense.
16

54 STAT. 1235 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 486(b) (1946).
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Here, again, the administrative authority is administering
policies determined upon by Congress, yet which involve
broad discretion. Acting under this provision, the Authority
(Civil Aeronautics Board) has fixed mail rates for the carriers, sufficient in general to "enable them to do a little better
than break even. The Authority merely follows the method
of subtracting non-mail revenues from total approved expenses and fixing a rate which would a little more than make
up the difference." 1' Such procedure cannot by any stretch
of the imagination be called judicial. Nor is it rule making.
Again, there is neither a judicial procedure nor a legislative action when the Federal Power Commission establishes
rates for federal power project utilities, or interstate electric
utilities, or natural gas pipe lines, upon the original cost
basis. 8 This basis, except for detailed adjustments, is not
developed by means of a hearing, but almost automatically
results from cost accounts which the Commission sets up
and enforces.
The Maritime Commission furnishes another example of
rate making which is purely administrative in nature. The
Commission has custody of the tariffs filed with it under the
Shipping and Intercoastal Acts, 9 analyzes and classifies rate
and tariff information, maintains a public file room where
tariffs and related information are available, receives voluntary filings of port bills of lading, and receives all agreements
entered into within the purview of Section 15 of the Shipping
Act. Such agreements are scrutinized, and correspondence
is had with proponents regarding the removal of ambiguities
or provisions indicating discriminatory practices, by an
17 Ballard, Federal Regulation of Aviation, 60 H~Auv. L. Rv. 1261-1262
(1947).
18 Blachly and Oatman, Actual Legitimate Original Cost as a Basis for Utility
Regulation--The Experience of the Federal Power Commission, 36 Gao. L. J. 487
et seq. (1948).
19 Shipping Act of Sept. 7, 1916, 39 STAT. 728 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 801.
Intercoastal Shipping Act, 47 STAT. 1425 (1933), as amended, 49 STAT. 1987 (1936),

46 U.S.C. § 844 (1946).
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Agreement Section 20 which prepares them for the Director's
signature and for action by the Commission. Conference
agreements and compacts may be made in respect to rates,
charges, shipping schedules, practices, classifications, transfer charges, joint rates, storage charges, etc. Such agreements and compacts are analyzed by the Agreement and
the Rate and Tariff Sections, respectively, and if found unexceptionable, are approved by the Commission as a routine
matter. If a protest regarding the agreement is received, a
rather critical examination takes place, and the attempt is
made to reach a solution, satisfactory to all. If such a golution is not achieved, the section may recommend suspension
of the agreement or compact. The Commission suspends or
refuses to suspend without a formal hearing, although it
usually has correspondence with the parties. If, however,
a suspension is ordered, a hearing may be scheduled for the
purpose of determining the propriety of the proposed rate.2 1
If the Commission, on its own motion, does not order a
hearing, a protestant may compel it to do so by filing a formal complaint that the rates in question are improper. It is
specifically provided by statute that the Commission may
enter into a hearing concerning the lawfulness of a filed rate,
without complaint, answer or other formal pleadings. Even
when the Commission is determining upon the protest of a
private individual, it is not acting in an adversary capacity;
but is making an investigation of a legislative type. H-owever, when rates, charges or practices have been held to be
improper, the Commission may act judicially by issuing a
cease and desist order or an award of reparations.2 2 After
See Federal Register of Sept. 11, 1946, 177A-593.
The suspension of a tariff does not imply positive disapproval, but means
only that the Commission considers further investigation necessary. Hence it
appears that an order of suspension is not a final order under the Administrative
Procedure Act, § 10(c).
22 See In Matter of Rates, Charges and Practices of Carriers Engaged in the
Trade from Japan to the United States, U.S.M. No. 561, decided Nov. 15, 1940;
S. H. Kress and Co. v. Baltimore Mail Steamship Co., U.S.M. No. 559, decided
Dec. 10, 1940; John G. Neidinger Co. v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., U.S.
M.C. No. 549, decided Jan. 14, 1940, 2 U.S.M.C.
20
21
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the Commission makes a finding, it generally holds the record
optn for submission by the respondent of a new agreement
or other action, consistent with the finding.23 Altogether,
it appears that the work of the Maritime Commission in
respect to rates, services, and so on is largely of a rulemaking, investigatory, approving and adjusting type, and is
of a judicial nature only when the Commission issues a cease
and desist order.
An examination of the managerial functions, of these
agencies of economic regulation shows: 'that they are too
varied and are governed by too many different types of
statutory provisions, to be thrown under any one formula,
such as the rule-making and judicial control formula of the
Ad. 'inistrative Procedure Act; that in many cases Congress,
by laying down factors which they must take into consideration, has forced them to exercise a broad scope of discretion;
and that in carrying out their managerial functions they
seldom exercise a judicial function.
Recognition by the courts of the fact that making a determination involving administrative management is a discretionary act has been expressed in many decisions, including several recent ones. In the case of Railroad Commission
v. Rowen and Nichols,2 4 the Supreme Court said:2"
A controversy like this always calls for a fresh reminder
that courts must not substitute their notions of expediency
and fairness for those which have guided the agencies to
whom the formulation and execution of policy have been entrusted... whether a system of proration based upon hourly
potential is as fair as one based upon estimated recoverable
reserves or some other factor or combination of factors, is in
itself a question for administrative and not judicial judgment.
28 Pacific Westbound Conference Agreement (Agreement No. 7790) U.S.M.C.
No. 645.
24 310 U.S. 573, 60 S.Ct. 1021, 84 L.Ed. 1368 (1940), opinion altered and
rehearing denied, 311 U.S. 614, 61 S.Ct. 66, 85 L.Ed. 390 (1940); 311 U.S. 570,
61 S.Ct. 343, 85 L._d. 358 (1941).
25 310 U.S. 573, 580-581, 60 S.Ct. 1021, 84 L.Ed. 1368 (1940).
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In the case of FederalPower Commission v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. of America,26 the Court said, in sustaining a
rate order of the Federal Power Commission:
Agencies to whom this legislative power (rate-making) has
been delegated are free, within the ambit of their statutory
authority, to make pragmatic adjustments which may be called
for by particular circumstances. Once a fair hearing has been
given, proper findings made and other statutory requirements
satisfied, the courts cannot intervene in the absence of a
clear showing that the limits of due process have been overstepped. If the Commission's order, as applied to the facts
before it and viewed in its entirety, produces no arbitrary
result, our inquiry is at an end.

The foregoing passages, and many others which might be
cited, show that the Supreme Court recognizes the activities
in question as administrative in nature. Obviously, when
agencies are making "pragmatic adjustments which may be
called for by particular circumstances," they are neither legislating nor adjudicating, but are administering.
To summarize: In the field of economic management, the
administrative agencies are acting as agents of Congress in
making detailed applications of policies already laid down by
Congress. They are not creating such policies themselves.
Any policy which they formulate is incidental to the implementation of the law. The determinations which they make
are almost identical with those which fall into the higher
brackets of private management. Here the government is
exercising a "super management" function in order to protect
the public interest.
The purpose of giving an agency such a function is not primarily to enable it to settle disputes or to prosecute for
wrongful action; but rather to provide it with the tools and
the methods required for making the economic adjustments
required in a highly complex, mechanized economy, and to
balance the interests of a privately owned and operated busi26
27

315 U.S. 575, 62 S.Ct. 736, 86 L.Ed. 1037 (1942).
Id. at 586.
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ness structure with the interests of the public. The agencies
charged with this function are in no sense acting as police
authorities, charged with the enforcement of specific statutory clauses which cover the situation. It is true that some
of their activities may be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial
in nature; but their basic work is administration. All of
their various activities operate as a unity in which each part
exists for the sake of the whole.
Moreover, several new factors have entered into the picture which make the process as a whole clearly administrative rather than either legislative or judicial. The adoption
by Congress of a national transportation policy is one of
these. Another is the new competitive situation due to the
development of motor, water and air transportation.28 Yet
another is the need of protecting such broad national and
international interests as the conservation of natural resources, the national defense, and economic stability, through
a process of taking hundreds of separate concrete actions
within the general policies laid down by Congress. The need
of dealing forcefully and adequately with such matters is of
28 The old type of judicialized procedure in rate making, and of court control,
based upon the requirement of a fair rate of return upon the fair value of the
property, becomes practically meaningless under the force of such competition.
To fix a rate in this way might destroy a business by throwing all trade to a
corporation with lower rates. The Supreme Court recognized this new factor in
the case of Eastern-Central Motor Carriers Association v. United States, 321 U.S.

194, 205, 64 S.Ct. 499, 88 L.Ed. 668 (1944), by a decision which said in part:
"But with the evolution of other forms of carriage, particularly motor carriage,
and the Commission's acquisition of control over their rates and operations, a
new situation arose. The Commission's task no longer was merely the regulation
of a single form of transportation, to secure reasonable and nondiscriminatory
rates and service. It becomes not merely the regulator, but to some extent the
co-ordinator of different modes of transportation. With the addition of motor
and water carriage to its previous jurisdiction over rails, it was charged not only
with seeing that the rates and services of each are reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory, but that they are coordinated in accordance with the national
transportation policy as declared by the later legislation. This, while intended
to secure the lowest rates consistent with adequate and efficient service and to
preserve within the limits of the policy and inherent advantages of each form
of transportation, at the same time was designed to eliminate destructive competition not only within each form but also between or among the different forms

of carriage." See also, Blachly, The Role of Smyth v. Ames in Federal Rate
Regulation, 33 VA. LAW Rtv. at 149, 150 (1947).
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equal importance with that of protecting the rights of the
individual from inimical agency action.
The Administrative Procedure Act, by placing the determinations as to rates, facilities, appliances, services, valuations, accounting, or any practices bearing upon any of these,
under the designation of rules, initially puts them into the
legislative category on the ground that they have a future
effect. When it comes to procedure, however, they are placed
in the category of adjudication, merely because the statutes
usually provide that such determinations shall be made on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, even
though the work done is actually administrative. Such a
requirement places them automatically under the complete
judicial control of Section 10 of the Act.
If what has been said regarding the managerial function
is correct (that it is basically not adjudication, but rather
the adjusting of complex economic and social relationships;
that the criteria laid down by Congress make the function
highly discretionary in nature; that the agencies are operating in the public interest, with a full quiver of administrative
powers which cannot well be separated from their deciding
powers; that the factors of competition have made the concept of a fair return upon the present day value of the
property untenable; and that because of various new factors
the relationship of the courts to these managing agencies has
been fundamentally changed), then to throw the procedure
for making highly discretionary economic determinations
into a judicial mould and to subject them to the same type
of control as though they were judicial acts, is completely
inconsistent with the present factual situation. 9
29 According to § 2(d) of the Act, " 'Adjudication' means agency process
for the formulation of an order." But since actions Tequired by statute to be
taken on the record after opportunity for a hearing (as is the case with most
managerial determinations), although classified as rules by § 2(c) of the Act,
are subjected to the adjudicatory process by § 5, it is a fair conclusion that they
are to be considered as orders, even though the definition of order excludes rules
(§ 2(d)). In other words, an action which according to one definition is a rule,
by being run through the adjudicatory process, becomes by another definition
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This is true both from the viewpoint of procedure and
from that of judicial review. If the function is managerial
and not adjudicatory, a judicialized procedure is in general
inapplicable. To try to solve complex economic relationships
as though they were judicially provable is nonsense. It is
equally meaningless to treat an informative hearing as
though it were a case being decided by a court. In establishing rates, for example, an agency is dealing with speculations
and prophesies which may or may not work out as has been
expected. The results of the rate may be influenced by
unforseeable wage increases, inflation, deflation, new competitive forces, the fears of investors, other types of government control, the swing of the business cycle, and similar
factors.
II. How the Administrative Procedure Act Affects
the Administrative Management Function.

Certain provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
regarding procedure and judicial control are quite incompatible with the function of administrative economic management. A brief analysis of these provisions will demonstrate
this fact.
As was said above, many of the subjects of economic
management are classified by the Act as rules and treated
as legislative in nature.8 0 Logically, then, the procedure in
respect to them should also be legislative in nature, that is,
it should be required merely for the purpose of obtaining
information upon which to act. Since the actions to be taken
are largely discretionary, they, like legislative actions, should
be based upon broad considerations and not merely upon the
specific factors brought out at the hearing."'
an order. An examination of determinations made by several important agencies
shows that actions which under § 2(c) would be called rules are issued as orders.
There is in any case a fundamental discrepancy among the provisions cited.
30 § 2(c).
81 Because of the many factors discussed above.
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The Administrative Procedure Act, after classifying managerial actions as of a legislative or policy nature,"2 immediately throws them into a judicialized procedure by the
simple expedient of saying that: "Where rules are required
by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing, the requirements of Sections 7 and 8
(those providing for adjudicatory procedure) shall apply... "in place of the informal procedures of Section 4 (b).
Since in almost all instances the statutes do so provide in
either a general or a specific way, most of the managerial
functions are automatically thrown into the adjudicatory
process. It is true that each and every factor of the adjudicatory process may not apply to these so-called rules. The
first and most important exception, provided it is one, is that
the requirement of separation of functions between the investigatory or prosecuting staff and the hearing officer is
not to be applied to formal rule making as it is to pure adjudication.3 3 Others are that agencies engaged in formal
rule making may dispense not only with the initial decision
82 The Attorney General's Manual says: "Rule making is agency action
which regulates the future conduct of either groups of persons or a single person;
it is essentially legislative in nature, not only because it operates in the future
but also because it is primarily concerned with policy considerations." (14)
33 This interpretation is based upon the statements in both House and Senate
Reports (House Committee Report, pages 264-265; Senate Committee Report,
pages 203-204) that section 5 applies to adjudication and not to rule making.
Section 5(c) provides: "This subsection shall not apply in determining applications
for initial licenses or to proceedings involving the validity or application of rates,
facilities, or practices of public utilities or carriers." The reason given by Representative Walter for-these exceptions is, that "these types of cases (i.e., the determination of the reasonableness of rates in the past) are customarily consolidated
with rule-making proceedings where the separation of functions is not required
so that, unless excepted from this provision, either rule making would be restricted
beyond the intent of the bill or consolidated proceedings would be impossible."
(House Proceedings, pages 361-362, in Legislative History).
One difficulty in interpreting these exceptions arises from the fact that the
word "past" was omitted from the clause dealing with the "application of rates,
facilities, or practices of public utilities or carriers."
This bill is so badly constructed and ambiguously phrased, however, that
Section 5(c) may be construed to apply to rule-making, for the following reasons:
This section is made applicable to sections 7 and 8, subject to the exceptions specified. But sections 7 and 8, according to section 4, shall be applied to formal rulemaking. Hence sectiun 5(c) does hold for such rule-making, particularly since the
formulation and adoption of rules did not appear in the list of exceptions.
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of the presiding examiner but also with his recommended
decision and that the separation of functions does not apply
to an agency or a member or members thereof. 4 Also in
formal rule making an agency may, "where the interests of
any party will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures
for the submission of all or part of the evidence in written
form." 35
Despite these concessions to the rule making process, there
are several difficulties in the procedure prescribed by the
Act. The first of these is the difficulty of determining just
when it is necessary to adopt the adjudicatory procedure.
Many statutes conferring power upon agencies to make rules
of general applicability lack any statement as to the procedure that is to be followed. Other statutes, while requiring rules of general applicability to be made "after a hearing" or "-after a full hearing"," have no express requirement that the rules be issued on the basis of the record
developed at the hearing. Although in respect to the making
of rules of particular applicability the requirement of a
record is generally present, in many instances it must be
adduced by implication.
A second difficulty arises in respect to the trial examiners,
especially their training and experience and their relationship to the deciding authority. When helping to perform the
managerial function trial examiners are dealing almost exclusively with economic relationships; hence they should generally be economists rather than lawyers. It is much more
important that they should be able to ask questions which
will bring out the factors of the economic problems involved
and the considerations necessary to protect the public inter34

§§ 8(a), 5(c).

Ibid.
See, for example, United States Warehouse Act, in respect to the suspension or revocation of warehouseman's licenses, 39 STAT. 487 (1923), a3
amended, 46 STAT. 1464 (1931), 7 U.S.C. § 253 (1946); Securities and Exchange
Act, 52 STAT. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780-3(g) (1946); and the Communications
Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1085 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1946).
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est, than that they should merely be judges of the evidence
submitted. This is particularly true when, as was shown,
they are dealing with complicated economic relationships.
Because of the nature of their work, they should be subject
to the general control of the agency rather than be quite
independent from it.
In disciplinary or other truly judicial activities, certainly,
it may be expedient to have the trial examiners act in a
rather independent capacity. This does not hold, however,
in respect to the function of economic management; for here
the trial examiner is helping to administer a basic policy
with which the agency is charged, and which has been laid
down by Congress to be implemented by the agency through
its discretionary determinations. In other words, the trial
examiners are not making judicial pronouncements or judgments, but policy determinations that should be in harmony
with the legislative and administrative policy. The examiners
should act as assistants of the agency, which has the power
of final determination, rather than as largely independent
judicial authorities. 7 The more independence that is exercised by the trial examiners, the more certain it is that each
responsible agency will be forced either to consider cases
de novo, or else to review them upon its own motion. Either
one of these solutions places an intolerable burden upon the
responsible authority.
The whole theory of the Act in respect to trial examiners
is based upon the assumption that they should act as judges
87 In respect to the relationship of the trial examiners to agencies before the
passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, Mr. John Foster Dulles has said:
"The lack of complete judicial independence on the part of hearing commissioners
is, of course, neither accidental nor inevitable. The reason is that the same hearing
commissioners may also have to adjudicate, in the first instance, the second
category of cases; those in which the Congress has prescribed that the determinative element is to be the expert judgment and discretion, the economic planning of the agency. The hearing commissioner, in this type of case, will serve
no useful role unless he is intimately familiar with the opinions, policies and
plans of the Commission and can fully interpret them." Dulnes, The Effect *z
Practice of the Report on Adm tistrative Procedure, 41 CoL. L. REV. 617, 622
(1941).
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of the first instance, and should therefore be independent,
should perform no duties inconsistent with the judging function, and should be under as little control by the responsible
agency as is possible.3" This relationship will inevitably lead
to great confusion, expense, and lack of coordinated policy
in respect to the managerial functions. Undoubtedly the
differences in opinion between trial examiners and the deciding agency will lead to the institution of many suits which
would be unnecessary were the examiners in a less independent position.
Another difficulty is connected with the burden of proof
provisions in the Act. It has been shown that the managerial
activity is highly discretionary in nature and involves adjustments the validity of which is not susceptible to absolute
proof, especially since many are based upon prophesies and
are affected by changing economic conditions. Hence the
requirement that "the proponent of a rule or order shall
have the burden of proof," as set forth by Section 7 (c) of
the Act, if logically followed leads to the absurd conclusion
that that which cannot be proved must be proved.
The question, what is discretion, is another point of difficulty. It seems certain that nearly all the judicial review
provisions of the Act are made applicable to practically all
managerial activities; for the statute provides that "every
agency action made reviewable by statute and every final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy
in any court shall be subject to judicial review;" 39 except
where the statutes preclude judicial review or where the
action is by law committed to agency discretion. Since very
few managerial actions are expressly precluded from judicial
review,40 the important question is whether managerial
See §§ 7, 8 and 11.
§ 10(c).
40 As an instance in which a statute precludes judicial review of managerial
orders, may be mentioned the power of the Secretary of Agriculture to suspend,
and after hearing, to revoke certain registrations and authorizations by order
which "shall not be subject to review." Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 STAT.
168 (1921), as amended, 56 STAT. 372 (1942), 7 U.S.C. § 217a (1946).
38

39

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

actions escape the provisions of the Act because they are
by law committed to agency discretion. This depends upon
how the words "agency discretion" are interpreted. If they
are to be interpreted as meaning discretion expressly named
as such and given by statute, relatively few instances can
be found. Hence under this interpretation the managerial
functions are generally subject to all the provisions of the
Act regarding judicial review. If, however, the words are
to be interpreted as meaning implied discretion, then logically most of the managerial functions should be exempted
from the provisions regarding judicial review, since it is
recognized "' that they are legislative in nature and are concerned with policy which implies wide discretion.
There are several considerations which militate against
the latter interpretation. The first is the fact that most
statutes require orders and determinations in the field of
administrative management to be made after notice and
hearing.2 Another is that in nearly all cases the statutes
provide for judicial review, either generally or specifically.4 3
Such an interpretation was also far removed from the thinking of the proponents of the Act. A statement of Senator
McCarran makes this clear. He said: "'Committed by law'
means of course, that (the) claimed discretion must have
been intentionally given the agency by Congress, rather than
assumed by it in the absence of express statement of law to
the contrary." 41 Abuse of discretion is expressly made
reviewable.46
In respect to the scope of review under Section 10 (c),
the Act greatly affects the managerial functions. The par41

"We are in the legislative realm of fixing rates." U. S. v. Morgan, 313

U.S. 409, 417, 62 S.Ct. 52, 86 L.Ed. 565 (1941).
42 See Blachly and Oatman, Statutory Administrative Orders, 25 IowA L. Rav.
555, 595-6 (1940).
48 Id. at 606 ff.
44 Address to American Bar Association, reprinted in 93 CoNG. Rae. A108,
All (1947).
45 § 10(e) (B) (1).
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ticular provisions in point have to do with (a) the judicial
decision of "all relevant questions of law"; (b) the determination of the "meaning or applicability of the terms of
any agency action"; (c) the setting aside of "agency actions,
findings, and conclusions unsupported by substantial evidence"; and (d) the "review of the whole record, or such
portions thereof as may be cited by any party." These provisions will be discussed briefly, and some consideration will
be given to their effects.
a. The reviewing court "shall decide all relevant questions of law."
The determinations of the reviewing court upon questions
of law must be considered from two viewpoints: constitutional law, and the legal questions arising in connection with
the enforcement of a given statute. Although the courts
have gone a long way toward repudiating the doctrine of
Smytk v. Ames,46 they still cling to the doctrine that "due
process of law" applies to the substance of the law or to its
economic effects. In other words, they can decide upon the
"reasonableness" of an act of economic management, such
as rate regulation, the grant of a certificate of public convenience and necessity and the like. This is clearly implied
even in cases largely repudiating the doctrine of Smyth v.
Ames, such as the Hope case," where the court said: "If
the total effect of a rate order cannot be said to be unjust
and unreasonable, judicial inquiry is at an end." That is,
whether or not such an administrative determination is as
a matter of fact unjust and unreasonable, is still a question
which the courts will decide under the due process clause.
.Paragraph (e) of Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act would appear to impose a clear mandate that such questions must be decided by the reviewing court.
46
See Blachly, The Role of Smyth v. Ames in Federal Rate Regulation, 33
VA. L. REv. 141 (1947).
47 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602,
64 S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed. 333 (1944).
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From the viewpoint of technical questions of statutory
law, the recent tendency of the courts not to substitute their
judgment for that of the administrative agency as shown,
for example, in the cases of Dobson v. Commissioner4 8 and
9 seems to be checked by the provision in
Gray v. Poll
question. In the Dobson case the Supreme Court said: "In
deciding law questions courts may properly attach weight to
the decision of points of law by an administrative body having special competence to deal with the subject matter.
While its decisions (those of the Tax Court) may not be
binding precedents for courts dealing with similar problems,
uniform administration would be promoted by conforming
to them where possible." This sound tendency on the part
of the courts would be largely nullified by the clear mandate
of the Administrative Procedure Act that all such questions
shall be decided by the reviewing court itself, and in the
exercise of its own independent judgment.
b. The reviewing court "shall determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of any agency action."
In the managerial functions, as has been pointed out, the
administrative agencies are not only making determinations
of fact, but are also using the powers bestowed upon them
in an administrative way. That is, they are taking action
appropriate to definite situations in which the public interest
is at stake. Examples of such actions are: placing limitations upon the grant of certificates of public convenience and
necessity; determining upon proper rate relationships; determining upon the joint use of facilities, and so on. The
provision as to the applicability of the terms of any agency
action would appear to make it mandatory upon the courts
to consider whether the particular solution of such a problem adopted by an agency were applicable to the given situation. This would practically destroy the use of administra48
49

320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239, 88 L.Ed. 248 (1943).
314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326, 86 L.Ed. 301 (1941).
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tive discretion, which is necessary to the performance of any
managerial function.
The provision requiring the courts to determine the meaning of the terms of any agency action seems to require the
courts themselves to look into all questions of fact as well
as law. This interpretation is sustained by a significant
omission. In the draft bill of the minority of the Attorney
General's Committee (which formed the basis of the Administrative Procedure Act), after an enumeration of specific
questions of law and fact that might be raised in review,
there was added the following provision: "Provided, however, that upon such review due weight shall be accorded the
expertness, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and
legislative policy of the agency involved as well as the discretionary authority conferred upon it." " This proviso is
entirely absent from the Administrative Procedure Act. The
net result might very well be that if the courts should follow
the mandate they would go into every detail of the administrative determination, although they have no detailed competence in technical matters and although such an examination would take an impossible amount of time. There would,
in effect, be an appeal from Peter expert to Paul inexpert;
with the practical disappearance of administrative discretion.
Since the provision is put in mandatory form, either the
courts must ignore the mandate or else assume the unending
task of going into questions of fact.
It is made the duty of the courts to set aside "agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be... unsupported
by substantial evidence subject to the requirements of sections 7 and 8, or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute.. ." 1
In order to understand the full implication of this provision, it is necessary to compare it with the scope of review
50

Fn.AL REPoRT, ATToRNEY GENz.A's Comm='r

247 f. (1941).
51 § 10(e) (B) (5).
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over managerial actions provided by the many specific statutes dealing with the subject. Review over such actions, as
a rule, has been established by two separate and distinct
methods, the statutory injunction 52 and the transcript of
the record procedure.5 3 In connection with the older injunc52 The statutory Injunction method is made applicable to orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, except orders under the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 220
(1913), 28 U.S.C. §§47, 47a (1946); The Federal Communications Commission
(certain orders), 48 STAT. 1093 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1946); the United
States Maritime Commission, 39 STAT. 737-8 (1916), 49 STAT. 1987 (1936), 46 U.S.
C. § 828 (1946); the Secretary of Agriculture (most orders in respect to stockyards), 42 STAT. 168 (1921), 7 U.S.C. § 217 (1946). It should be noted that in
none of these statutes is there any mention of the scope of review.
53 The review upon the transcript of the record before the circuit court of
appeals, including the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, is
the appellate method (either exclusive, or applicable only to certain determinations) used with respect to the acts of many federal agencies. To give as complete a picture as possible to support the claim that the review provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act are far broader in scope than statutory provisions,
each agency will be listed, and the express statutory provision governing the
scope of review will be cited:
1. Wage and Hour and Contracts Division, 52 STAT. 1065 (1938), 29 U.S.C.
§ 210 (1946). "The review of the Court shall be limited to questions of law, and
findings of fact by the Administrator when supported by substantial evidence
shall be conclusive."
2. Civil Aeronautics Board, 52 STAT. 1024 (1938), as amended, 54 STAT. 1235
(1940), 49 U.S.C. § 646 (1946). "The findings of fact by the Board, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive."
3. Secretary of Agriculture under the Commodity Exchange Act, 42 STAT.
1001 (1922), as amended, 49 STAT. 1498, 1499 (1936), 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1946). "And
the findings of the Secretary of Agriculture as to the facts, if supported by the
weight of evidence, shall in like manner be conclusive."
4. Federal Power Commission, 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b)
(1946). "The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive."
5. Foreign Trade Zones Board, 48 STAT. 1002 (1934), 19 U.S.C. § 81 r (1946).
"The testimony and evidence taken or submitted before the Board . . . shall be
considered by the court as the evidence in the case."
6. Federal Alcohol Administration, 49 STAT. 978 (1935), as amended, 54 STAT.
1232 (1940), 27 U.S.C. § 204(h) (1946). "The findings of the Secretary as to
the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive."
7. Federal Communications Commission, 48 STAT. 926 (1934), as amended,
50 STAT. 197 (1937), 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1946) (in certain matters). "That the
review by the court shall be limited to questions of law and that findings of fact
by the Commission, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive unless
it shall clearly appear that the findings of the Commission are arbitrary or
capricious."
8. Interstate Commerce Commission, orders under the Clayton Act, 48 STAT.
901 (1934), as amended, 48 STAT. 926 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1946). "The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive."
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tive methods, the statutes say nothing as to the conclusiveness of administrative determinations, leaving this question
to the courts. The statutes which establish the newer form
of judicial review upon the transcript of the record almost
9. Administrator under the Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Acts, 52 STAT. 1055
(1938), as amended, 54 STAT. 1237 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 371f (1946). "The findings
of the Administrator as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive."
10. Secretary of Agriculture, in re withdrawal of privilege of trading in a
contract market, 42 STAT. 1001 (1922), as amended, 49 STAT. 1498, 1499 (1936),
7 U.S.C. § 9 (1946). "And the findings of the Secretary of Agriculture as to the
facts, if supported by the weight of evidence, shall in like manner be conclusive."
11. Secretary of Agriculture, under the packer's part of the Packers and
Stockyards Act, 42 STAT. 162 (1921), as amended, 48 STAT. 926 (1934), 7 U.S.C.
§ 194d (1946). "The evidence so taken or admitted, duly certified and filed as
aforesaid, shall be considered by the court as the evidence in the case."
12. Securities and Exchange Commission, under various laws, 48 STAT. 80
(1933), as amended, 48 STAT. 926 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77i (1946); 48 STAT. 901
(1934), as amended, 48 STAT. 926 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1946); 49 STAT.
834 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79x (1946); 53 STAT. 1175 (1939), 13 U.S.C. § 77vvv
(1946); 54 STAT. 844 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-42 (1946); 54 STAT. 855 (1940),
15 U.S.C. § 80b-13 (1946). "The findings of the Commission as to the facts,
if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive."
It will thus be seen that in no case do the statutes provide for the wide scope
of review over regulatory activities given by the Administrative Procedure Act.
Compare these provisions showing the manifest intention of Congress to limit
the scope of review in all economic regulatory activities, with the scope of review
provided by the Administrative Procedure Act:
"So far as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning and applicability of the terms of any agency
action. It shall (A) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitation or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required
by law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the requirements of sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute; or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that
the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. In making the
foregoing determinations the court shall review the whole record or such portions
thereof as may be cited by any party, and due account shall be taken of the
rule of prejudicial error." (§ 10(e)).
It is clear from these citations that neither the statutes providing for the
statutory injunction method of review nor those providing 'for the transcript of
the record method, which control practically all the economic managerial determinations of the regulatory agencies, contain any such broad statements regarding
the scope of review as are found in section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure
Act. Hence the claims made by some persons to the effect that the Act merely
"restates the present law as to the scope of judicial review," or "did not change
the existing law of judicial review . . . by widening the scope of judicial review"
are completely inaccurate.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

universally provide that the findings of the agency as to
facts, "if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." " In several instances they specifically limit the
review to questions of law. 5 Under these statutes the burden of proof is placed upon the person contesting the administrative determination, to show that there was not such
evidence. Further, the statutes say nothing as to control
over the conclusions reached by the agency as the result of
the fact finding. Under the Administrative Procedure Act
the courts are mandatorily required to look not only at the
adequacy of the fact findings, but also at "actions" and
"conclusions" to see if they are unsupported by substantial
evidence.
This requirement does several things. In the first place,
the words "unsupported by substantial evidence" place upon
the agency the burden of proving that not only the fact finding but also the actions and conclusions resulting from such
findings are supported by substantial evidence. This provision must also be considered with the rule of evidence of
section 7 (c), which reads: "Except as statutes otherwise
provide, the proponent of a rule or order shall have the burden of proof." The two provisions taken together might
greatly enlarge the control of the courts over administrative
management actions.
In the second place, the provision in question establishes
a strict control over conclusions based upon the fact finding.
In managerial functions generally, the fact finding is not
nearly so important as the conclusions drawn from it. In
order to show the difference between the fact findings and
the conclusions, one or two examples will be considered. A
fact finding shows, let us say, that many of the timbers of a
house are rotten or are affected by termites. What shall the
owner do about this condition-tear the house down, put
in new timbers, or decide to take no action? The decision
Ibid.
55 Ibid.
54
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reached constitutes the conclusions drawn from the facts.
To take a more complex example, the facts brought out at
a hearing may show that a railroad is unable to meet its
expenses from the income which it receives, and is also
unable to borrow money to maintain and improve its facilities. What conclusions may be drawn from the facts? First,
the decision might be made that rates should be increased.
Second, on the contrary, it might be decided that rates
should remain the same, in the expectation that the process
of deflation would decrease the price of fuel, that the cost
of labor might go down or that greater efficiency might
bring about the proper adjustment. Third, it might be held
that lower rates would so increase the traffic as to remedy
the difficulties. Fourth, the conclusion might be reached
that no adjustment in rates would bring back the business
drawn away from the railroad by motor carriers, water carriers, air carriers, and the use of the automobile by private
individuals, and that the business ought to be liquidated.
Fifth, the situation might be deemed hopeless from the business viewpoint, but the possibility of a military emergency
might cause the agency to consider that it must be kept
going somehow, even by increasing rates of competing carriers, i.e., by setting minimum rates for them.
Such conclusions do not resemble the conclusions of guilty
or not guilty drawn by a jury from the facts set before it.
They do not resemble the conclusions of a- judge regarding
the penalty to be imposed in view of the jury's findings, or
in respect to the facts established in various civil suits. They
do not resemble the quasi-judicial conclusions based on facts
brought out in a reparation case, or in a case involving a
cease and desist order. These conclusions are of the same
nature that a business man draws."e They involve policy,
56 An excellent example of conclusions, which were mistakenly considered as
facts, appears in the case of Lang Transportation Corporation v. United States,
75 F. Supp. 915 (S. D. Calif. 1949). Here the court says, at p. 934: "In the
instant case the Commission has specifically found that the competition that
would result from the grant of authority to operate the proposed service in the
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and policy of a high order, since there must be a harmonization of many conflicting lines of interest. Moreover, the
results of the policy adopted must be seen before it can be
said that the conclusions are wrong. Further, it is not the
conclusions which are unreasonable or unjust. It is only the
historical results that may accrue from placing the conclusions into effect. The conclusions cannot possibly be justifiable, for they are predicated upon a present uncertainty
and a vague non-provable possibility that rights might suffer.
An attempt to control conclusions before the results of applying the conclusions are known is like an attempt to control
prophesy itself. No court is in a position to say that a different conclusion would yield better results, or that the
facts demand the adoption of a certain conclusion.
Finally, all the foregoing considerations show that no party
could possibly claim a legal right to have a certain conclusion drawn, or show a legal injury because some other conclusion had been adopted. Despite the fact that there is
nothing judicial about making conclusions in respect to policy, the Administrative Procedure Act imposes upon the
courts the duty of determining whether such conclusions and
the related actions are proper. In other words, the courts
are required to take jurisdiction over discretionary actions
and decisions as to policy. It would be entirely proper for
territory involved would provide a stimulus for a better service to the public;
that the proposed territory would support an additional motor carrier service
without impairing the existing service of protestants now serving it; and that
the public interest would be best served by granting the authority sought.
"These basic and essential findings, the court finds, are adequate to support
the report and order of the Commission of April 8, 1946."
It is clear that the so-called facts here cited are conclusions. A fact is an
event or object in the past or the present; these conclusions are estimates regarding the future. They partake of the nature of a prophesy, since they represent
the judgment of the Commission (doubtless based on facts not shown here, such
as the area and population of the territory, the services and rates of the protestants, etc.) as to the probable results of a future situation. These conclusions
are definitely administrative rather than judicial. In requiring the reviewing courts
to set aside conclusions found to be unsupported by substantial evidence, the
Administrative Procedure Act seeks to compel the court to depart from the
judicial function and to exercise judgment of an administrative type.
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the Supreme Court to declare the judicial review provisions
of the Act unconstitutional, on the ground that they would
compel the courts to carry out administrative functions. A
more flagrant violation of the doctrine of the separation of
powers would be hard to find.
d. The courts "shall review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party." 5
In other words, if any party asks for a review of the whole
record the court must comply. This sentence must be considered in connection with the provision just discussed, regarding the review of "agency action, findings and conclusions." These two sentences, taken together, as Mr. Dickinson points out,5" practically require a review of substantiality
on the whole record. First, not only must the court find
whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the
findings and conclusions, but it must examine all of the evidence on the other side, and consider the question whether
against the background of the conflicting testimony and
exhibits it still regards the evidence on which the finding of
fact was based as substantial.5" This would compel the
judges to weigh and balance all the evidence in the recorda thing that they have refused to do in cases involving
§10(e) (B) (6).
58 Dickinson, Judicial Review Provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (Section 10) Background and Effects, in FEDERAL AD= sTRATxvE PROCEDURE Acr AND TrE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENcxES 546, 586.
59 Regarding the rule of substantial evidence on the whole record, in the
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case of In Matter of Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256, 26 N.E. (2d)
247, 255 (1940), the New York Court of Appeals said: "The evidence produced
by one party must be considered in connection with the evidence produced by
other parties. Evidence which, unexplained, might be conclusive may lose all
probative force when supplemented and explained by other testimony. The Board
must consider and sift all the evidence." Cited by Mr. John Dickinson in
FEDERAL ADMINITRATwVE PROCEDURE ACT, etc., p. 559. Mr. Benjamin, in the
same publication, quotes a remark made by Judge Lehman to a lawyer who was
arguing a case before the New York Court of Appeals, where the judge said:

"Mr. Seward, you have recounted to us evidence in support of the Board's
finding that appears to be substantial. I suggest that you now permit the respondent to argue, because the question for this court is whether, against the
background of the respondent's evidence, your evidence remains substantial." Mtd.
at 591.
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managerial functions. For example, in the St. Joseph Stockyard case " the Supreme Court said:
The court does not sit as a board of revision to substitute
its judgment for that of the legislature or its agents as to
matters within the province of either .... When the legislature

appoints an agent to act within that sphere of legislative
authority, it may endow the agent with power to make findings of fact that are conclusive, provided the requirements of
due process which are specially applicable to such an agency
are met, as in according a fair hearing and acting upon evidence and not arbitrarily ....

In such cases, the judicial in-

quiry into the facts goes no further than to ascertain whether
there is evidence to support the findings, and the question of
the weight of the evidence in determining issues of fact lies
with the legislative agency acting within its statutory authority.
As to the overall effects of the provisions just considered,

there is much difference of opinion. The claim is often made
that the Act enlarges neither the subject matter of review
nor the scope of review. The Attorney General takes the
position that: "
The provisions of Section 10 constitute a general restatement of the principles of judicial review embodied in many
statutes and judicial decisions. Section 10, it must be emphasized, deals largely with principles. It not only does not supersede special statutory review proceedings, but also generally
leaves the mechanics of judicial review to be governed by
other statutes and by judicial rules.

Professor Scanlan states that the Act "did not change the
existing law of judicial review, either by increasing the availability of the judicial remedy, or by widening the scope of
judicial review." 62

In respect to the Attorney General's position, several objections can be made. How is it possible, when a provision
is made mandatory " by the use of "shall" rather than
60 St. Joseph Stockyards v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 51, 56 S.Ct. 720,
80 L.d. 1033 (1936).
61

ATTORNzy GENRAL's

IMANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDuRE AcT,

93 (1941).
62 Scanlan, Jud&iWl Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 23
NomRE DAmm LAwYER 502, 503 (1948).
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"cmay" to hold that it merely deals with "principles"? How
can this mandatory provision avoid superseding earlier statutory 'law which conflicts with it? How can it be said that
the Act, which requires the reviewing court to set aside any
decision "unsupported by substantial evidence," and in so
doing to review the whole record if cited by any party, goes
no further than the provisions of statutes which are applicable to the managerial or regulatory function? Some of
these statutes, it is true, require "substantial evidence" to
support an administrative fact finding; but some are silent
on the matter, and others contain provisions to the general
effect that "The findings of fact of the Commission as to
facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive." 6 None
of them require the court to balance the evidence on both
sides, as it must do when it reviews the whole record. It has
been the practice of the courts to examine the record only
far enough to see whether it contains evidence sufficient to
support the fact finding. The requirement that they shall
review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be
cited by any party must mean that they can no longer confine -themselves to this question, but must also consider the
weight or preponderance of the evidence. No statute governing the review of managerial or regulatory action by either
the injunction method or the transcript of the record method
required the courts to "determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any agency action," or to hold unlawful
and set aside "conclusions" as well as fact findings. 5 How
can it be said that the provisions of the Act on scope of
review merely summarize "the principles of judicial review
embodied in many statutes and judicial decisions," when the
scope of review established is far wider than that which the
courts, for very cogent reasons, have declared applicable? 6
8 It should be noted that the provisions as to scope of review on the Act
use the word "shall." 60 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1946).
64 See notes 52, 53 supra.
65 Ibid.
66 See Notes 60, 68-74 infra.
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How is it that when one of the chief purposes of the Act,
loudly declared and widely advertised, was to check so-called
"administrative absolutism" by stringent judicial review, it
is now claimed that the Act left the situation just as it was?
Professor Scanlan's statement is partially answered by the
preceding paragraph. It may be added that a case which he
himself cites in various connections holds that section 10 (e)

clause 5 of the Act:

67

empowers the court to determine whether the findings of
fact made by the administrative agency are supported by substantial evidence, and to set them aside if its conclusion is in
the negative.... Consequently, in those cases in which the
scope of judicial review had been restricted within narrower
...

bounds,"it was enlarged to that extent.

What may be the results of such a wide extension of the
scope of judicial review? In the first place, logically, the
review provisions of the Act would supersede the numerous
former statutes providing for the review of the managerial
or regulatory determinations of the government. This is
true both because the scope of review established by the Act
is broader than that established by such statutes, and because the new provisions are mandatory in character.
In the second place, if rigorously applied, these review
provisions would reduce the independent boards and commissions and other regulatory authorities to little more than
fact finding agencies.
In the third place, if the courts follow in detail these new
provisions, there will be a fundamental change in the relationship which the Constitution appears to contemplate and
which the courts have developed between themselves and the
administrative bodies, particularly in respect to managerial
action. What this relationship is can best be shown by extracts from relevant cases.
67

United States v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp. 216, 219 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).
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In the Pottsville Broadcasting Company case 8 the Supreme Court said:
The history of Anglo-American courts and the more or
less narrowly defined range of their staple business have determined the basic characteristics of trial procedure, the rules
of evidence, and the general principles of appellate review.
Modem administrative tribunals are the outgrowth of conditions far different from those. To a large degree they have
been a response to -the felt need of governmental supervision
over economic enterprise-a supervision which could effectively be exercised neither directly through self-executing legislation nor by the judicial process.... Perhaps the most striking
characteristic of this movement has been the investiture of
administrative agencies with power far exceeding and different from the conventional judicial modes for adjusting conflicting claims--modes whereby interested litigants define the
scope of the inquiry and determine the data on which the judicial judgment is ultimately based. Administrative agencies
have power themselves to initiate inquiry, or, when their
authority is invoked, to control the range of investigation
in ascertaining what is to satisfy the requirements of the public interest in. relation to the needs of vast regions and sometimes the whole nation in the enjoyment of facilities for transportation, communication and other essential public services.
These differences in origin and function preclude wholesale
transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial and review
which have evolved from the history and experience of courts.
But to assimilate the relation of these administrative
bodies and the courts to the relationship between the lower
and upper courts is to disregard the origin and purposes of
the movement for administrative regulation and at the same
time to disregard the traditional scope, however far-reaching,
of the judicial process. Unless these vital differentiations between the functions of judicial and administrative tribunals
are observed, courts will stray outside their province and read
the laws of Congress through the distorting lenses of inapplicable legal doctrine.

In Railroad Commission v. Rowen and Nictols, 9 the
Supreme Court said:
A controversy like this always calls for a fresh reminder
that courts must not substitute their notions of expediency
60 S.Ct. 437, 84 L.Ed. 656 (1940).
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309 U. S. 134, 142-144,
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310 U. S. 573, 581, 60 S.Ct. 1021, 84 L.Ed. 1368 (1940).

See note 25 supra.
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and fairness for those which have guided the agencies to
whom the formulation and execution of policy have been entrusted.... whether a system of proration based upon hourly
potential is as fair as one based upon estimated recoverable
reserves or some other factor or combination of factors, is in
itself a question for administrative and not judicial judgment.

In United States v. Morgan,"° the Supreme Court said:
In construing a statute setting up an administrative agency
and providing for judicial review of its action, court and
agency are not to be regarded as wholly independent and unrelated instrumentalities of justice, each acting in, the performance of its prescribed statutory duty without regard to the
appropriate function of the other in securing the plainly indicated objects of the statute. Court and agency are the means
adopted to attain the prescribed end, and so far as their duties
are defined by words of the statute, those words should be
so construed as to attain that end through co-ordinated action.

The Waterman Steamship Corporation case " further
dwelt upon this relationship. Here the Supreme Court said:
It is of paramount importance that courts not encroach
upon this exclusive power of the Board if effect is to be given
the intention of Congress to apply an orderly, informed and
specialized procedure to the complex, administrative problems
arising in the solution of industrial disputes. As it did in setting up other administrative bodies, Congress has left questions of law which arise before the Board-but not moreultimately to the traditional review of the judiciary. Not by
accident, but in line with a general policy, Congress has
deemed it wise to entrust the finding of facts to these specialized agencies. It is essential that courts regard this division
of responsibility which Congress as a matter of policy has
embodied in the very statute from which the Court of Appeals
derived its jurisdiction to act ...

In a recent decision

72

the Supreme Court said:

And so the Board, in performing its delegated function of
defining and applying these terms (employer and employee),
must bring to its task an appreciation of economic realities,
as well as a recognition of the aims which Congress sought
to achieve by the statute. This does not mean that it should
70
71

307 U. S. 183, 191, 59 S.Ct. 795, 83 L.Ed. 1211 (1939).
309 U. S. 206, 208, 60 S.Ct. 493, 84 L.Ed. 704 (1940).
72 National Labor Board v. Atkins, 331 U. S. 398, 403, 67 S.Ct. 1265, 91
L.Ed. 1563 (1947).
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disregard the technical and traditional concepts of "employee"
and "employer." But it is not confined to those concepts.
It is free to take account of -the more relevant economic and
statutory considerations. And a determination by the Board
based in whole or in part upon those considerations is entitled
to great respect by a reviewing court, due to the Board's
familiarity with the problems and its experience in the administration of the Act.

In Unemployment Commission v. Aragon 13 the Court
said:
To sustain the Commission's application of this statutory
term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached
had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings. The "reviewing court's function is limited." All that
is needed to support the Commission's interpretation is that
it has "warrant in the record" and a "reasonable basis in law."

In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery
Corporation74 it was said:
The scope of our review of an administrative order wherein
a new principle is announced and applied is no different from
that which pertains to an ordinary administrative action. The
wisdom of the principle adopted is none of our concern....
Our duty is at an end when it becomes evident that the Commission's action is based upon substantial evidence and is
consistent with the authority granted by Congress.

The Court further said:
The Commission avoided placing its sole reliance on inapplicable judicial precedents. Rather it has derived its conclusions from the particular facts of the case, its general experience in reorganization matters and its informed view of
statutory requirements. It is these matters which are the guide
for our review....
The Commission's conclusion here rests squarely on that
area where administrative judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts. It is the product
of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities
of the problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts. It is the type
78
74

329 U. S. 143, 153, 67 S.Ct. 245, 91 L.Ed. 136 (1946).
332 U. S. 194, 207, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947).
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of judgment which administrative agencies are best equipped
to make and which justifies the use of the administrative
process. Whether we agree or disagree with the results reached,
it is an allowable judgment which we cannot disturb.

Summary and Conclusions.
This paper has attempted to show: That in carrying out
functions of economic regulation, several of the important
boards, commissions and other agencies of the government
are exercising powers which are managerial in nature; that
these functions are carried out primarily to protect the public
interest in its largest aspects; that they are functions which
the legislature itself could well perform had it the time,
technical experience and equipment; that these agencies are
the extended arms of the legislature; and that their work
is secondary only to that of the lawmaking body. As in any
managerial function, a great deal of policy making and discretion must be involved. Insofar as these agencies are
carrying out managerial functions, they are not prosecuting;
they are not adjudicating; they are administering.
Economic determinations based on discretion and informed
judgment cannot be made by a purely adjudicatory process,
since they are legislative in nature and must involve considerations alien to that process. Although the function of
making such determinations should be the result of careful
study, should often be preceded by the hearing of evidence,
and where rights are involved, should be based on a procedure which guarantees fairness, it is of neither a prosecutory nor an adversary nature. Hence there is no reason
for throwing the procedure into the adjudicatory framework,
as is done by the Administrative Procedure Act.
The scope of judicial review with respect to managerial
functions should be severely limited for several reasons. One
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is the nature of the determinations which must be made,
whether various factors of discretion are or are not specifically provided for by Congress. A second is new economic
circumstances, such as the development of competition where
there was formerly monopoly, which have made it impossible to claim a legal right to a certain valuation or rate of
return. The process, under such circumstances, becomes one
of adjusting the interests of all those concerned, together
with the public interest. This interest has undergone a wide
extension in significance within recent years, due to war,
uncertain economic conditions, and the need for security
in a rapidly fluctuating economy. Again, such factors as a
grant or subsidy have entered into the picture, making judicial review difficult if not impossible. Finally, the courts
themselves have been developing more realistic and less
juristic theories regarding the basic nature of control, as
by assimilating rate making to the police power rather than
to the taking of property by expropriation. Under these
changed circumstances, also, the courts have found that their
relationship to the economic regulatory authorities has had
to undergo a profound change. They have tended more and
more, not to review the administrative managerial acts in
themselves, but only to consider matters of law such as proper delegation of powers, jurisdiction, and similar questions
of the most general type.
Despite the manifest policymaking and discretionary
nature of the determinations made by economic regulatory
agencies, the fact that new economic relationships are growing up, the combination of benefactory action with regulatory action, and the judicial development of a new basis
for such functions as rate making, the Administrative Procedure Act has sought to increase greatly the judicial
features of procedure and the scope of review over managerial acts. This attempt to intensify the judicialized pat-
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tern of procedure for the taking of managerial determinations, and to subject such determinations to a much stricter
judicial control than before, is based upon an inadequate
and confused view of the nature of administrative management, and goes contrary to present day economic and social
realities.
Frederick F. Blackly
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